

YOGA Meetings Second Phase - July - August in LondonMeeting No. 15

YOGA arrived alone, without delegation, in London in the morning of 18 July at about 09.45 hours. His arrival could not be spotted since he did not travel via the ANTOLOT TU-104 jet directly from MOSCOW which normally arrives at 10.30 hours. He arrived on an earlier plane. Upon arrival YOGA contacted TARRY and told him that the Soviet Embassy had booked him a room at the Kensington Close Club. Upon receiving this information from TARRY, MIKE booked a room at the same hotel and John Collins offered the use of his flat as a meeting place. TARRY informed subject that he should meet MIKE at a rendezvous point away from the hotel at which point MIKE picked subject up and drove him to the vicinity of the meeting place. Subject arrived with MIKE at 20.20 hours on July 18th. Upon entering, subject greeted the other three officers individually and stated that all was well and normal. He also mentioned that his wife cried because she could not accompany him to LONDON and that he had brought some MOSCOW vodka for us but MIKE told him not to go back to his room to get it at this time.

2. S: Next time I wish you would control the visa applications better. The entire delegation submitted visas to the British office on 11 July and the visas came too late for us to take the plane for which we had tickets. Just before we were to go and while waiting to get our delayed visas, KHRUSHCHEV reviewed the declaration of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. which was made on 1 July. This declaration authorised forty to fifty selected industrialists and scientists to go to LONDON during the time that the Soviet Exhibition was in progress and actually forty-four including myself were selected to go, but all of these trips were cancelled when KHRUSHCHEV reviewed the Declaration. Have you not seen the Declaration? I photographed it. G: Not yet because it is now being developed. S: Oh, I see, I will tell you about it.

3. S: I have received a nice little room but I thought you would be staying at the Mount Royal and we would be there. G: It is better to be here, since you have no legend to go constantly to the Mount Royal Hotel. S: If I had received my visa on time I would have come here alone and would have met you on Saturday 15th July. G: Why did not your people submit the request for a visa a day sooner? S: You were not correctly informed. Your secretary in your Visa Office received a request for visas from our Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 11th July. This included a request for my visa and ten other persons. H: That is not correct. I know that he received it on the 13th. S: Even so did you not get my cable on the 11th? Then you could have checked on the visa. H: We received the request for a visa on Thursday afternoon the 13th. And it would have been unusual to grant a visa earlier since no-one gets a visa in less than forty-eight hours. G: Nevertheless, it would have attracted undesirable attention.

4. S: Well anyway, KHRUSHCHEV revised his Declaration. I will tell you about it because it is on four frames of film.

5. G: How long are you planning to stay? S: I have been authorised to stay for three weeks. G: Whether the delegation came or not? S: Yes, either way. I received my visa on the 15th and my plane was due to fly on the 15th, but I could not fly out when I got the visa. The Embassy begins work at 1000 hours and I got my visa about 14.00 hours. H: That is right. The visa was granted only in the evening on Friday.

6. S: Here is my authorization for coming here from the G.M.T.K. (Subject presented the document, requested that it be photographed and returned to him. We pointed out that this document was for the entire delegation of which he was to be the head. He pointed out that it was

/signed.....

X S: The group requested visas, not just I alone.

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signed by SAMARIN who was the Deputy Chief of the Committee and that the new Committee Chief was RUDNEV who had replaced KHRUNICHIEV. ALEKSENKO also signed the document, another Deputy of RUDNEV).

7. G: And who has replaced that biggest chap? S: RUDNEV, Lieutenant General, Engineer of the Technical Service (Inzhener Tekhnicheskoy Sluzhby), An Electronic expert, who has been occupied all the time with defence technique [oboronnaya tekhnika]; about 54 years old, energetic, not all that bright, he replaced KHRUNICHIEV. G: Do you think that will be better for you? S: No. KHRUNICHIEV was more intelligent. KHRUNICHIEV was better for work. But for me - well, yesterday he called me in and said...well, I'll tell you in detail in a moment. Well, he set me the task, which we are to do together, before our meeting, my dear friends, that's all. Well, I didn't think I would come.

8. S: I thought to-day that the film would be ready, because it is very important. It is very important. G: It will be, it will be. This evening. S: I've already managed to get into such a larder! [Kladovku]. You can judge it by the material. It is the latest, the very latest views for 1960 and 1961 on military doctrine, on matters regarding the utilization of tanks, the fleet, the Air Force, the doctrine in general. G: They will bring it to us tonight. S: And this is where I photographed, first of all, KHRUSHCHEV's decrees. So I'm checking the documents, I handed all of them over to you. So I want to relate the most recent events... and it could have turned out so that we would not have been together to-day! Now let us analyse what we are to do in the future.

9. S: On the 4th of July I was called to GVISHIANI, already I was the Deputy Head of the section, the appointment had already gone through, and he said: on the 1st of July a decree was passed by Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. signed by KHRUSHCHEV, regarding the urgent, speedy assignment of 40 - 50 Soviet specialists to the Exhibition in London. The Committee appoints you the Head, the leader, in so far as you have already been in England, you have certain acquaintances, we are satisfied with your past trip' (to us; You did all this for me, despite MERRIBAN who did not make a meeting). S: GVISHIANI said "You are appointed the leader, urgently prepare 40 - 50 individuals including our own people". I said: "German Mikhailovich - what branches of industry shall we take? He said: "take chemistry, take light industry, metallurgists, machine constructors [mashino-stroitelj] and take the people who have already been in England, so that one should be able to get a visa for them quicker, and there is already an exit permit on record for them in the Central Committee which pokes its nose into everything; it will let them through faster, it will all be quite legal and correct". And I, together with my own people quickly prepared these groups.

10. S: We sent an application to the Central Committee - suddenly the Central Committee starts holding up. You see, we got the order on the 4th, and it was signed on the 1st. You will read it on the developed film to-day, with KHRUSHCHEV's signature, there it is written: "paragraph 1: ....second PATOLICHIEV and his wife for twelve days....paragraph 2 there: I don't remember it for the moment.....paragraph 3; that is what I told you about - it is entrusted to our Committee.....paragraph 4: PATOLICHIEV is allocated 9,000 'foreign currency roubles'....paragraph 5: ....in case the Exhibition is visited by Macmillan and Queen Elisabeth the Second, presents should be given them according to the instructions and arrangements by the Soviet Ambassador. (signed) KHRUSHCHEV, Executive of Affairs."

11. S: So now we are preparing things. We are preparing straight away files, characteristics, photographs are being prepared in full, everything. Time to leave approaches - I've already - that is, a note was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding my first group - I was

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again organise all this and do it, we need to have it done urgently, because it (the decree) was signed on the 1st, but we only got it on the 4th, and, by the way, on the KREML telephone. On the Government telephone, and this decree reached us later, when RUDNEV signed it on July 5th, but as I told you we heard about it on the 4th."

20. I started worrying, I didn't sleep for three nights and even got thin! I thought, because you didn't give a visa - I would have left for here to prepare the programme for them, and to Hell with them! Let them change everything else while I would already be here with you! So then on Monday they said the third paragraph had been revoked. Why had it been revoked? For two reasons: firstly a very strong impression was created by the Tartar who defected from the ballet while in France, a very strong impression. He was secretary of his Party organisation. So that you should know - Secretary of his Party organisation. He was chosen secretary by secret vote. Secondly, the people were prepared quickly, they were badly checked through the control organs, an exit permit was immediately demanded from the Section of the Central Committee and a visa was requested from you. And thirdly, what would the results be? Either the British would let them visit firms, or they wouldn't. And if they would not let them, then it would be a light entertaining stroll. And POLYANSKIJ managed to persuade KOZLOV to reconsider this point, and it was revoked. While I'd already got my visa! My passport had been brought to me, since the decision had been given me.

21. S: I went to - here is a cunning, intelligent manoeuvre - I came to SEROV, who saw me off this morning. I travelled with his wife and daughter. He saw me off this morning. In a suit like yours, only he had a star. But his wife and daughter are here in London, now. They came as tourists for twelve days, six in London and six in other towns. Tomorrow I shall be buying for them - I'll tell you more about it later. I shan't be buying it - we shall be buying it, for SEROV. (Laughs). So I came in and said: "Comrade Head of the Army, I was presented by the Committee with the leadership of the Committee, since they know that I am also a GRU worker and that I have interests in England, not only to carry out this work on the line of the Committee but also to fulfil our four tasks, regarding which I shall report to you shortly. There are four tasks which I have written down. My visa was granted by the English." My chiefs said: travel three or four times to the Capitalist countries. If you are recognised after having worked as a military attaché and Chief Assistant in Turkey, we shall put you up for a prolonged mission. We shall see how the attitude of the Americans, British and French will be to you after you were a military type, but now are a civilian."

22. S: Further, this was taken note of in the section of the Central Committee of the Party, and they gave me permission. Out of the entire 44 people only I was given permission. They said: "Let him go!" Why? Because the Central Committee knows that I work both in the Committee and I work in the GRU. So it means that I have two purposes to go for. I said: "What right have we got not to exploit this opportunity, and not go?" I discussed this to begin with with General SMOLIKOV, and then with General MALIK. you make this journey, along our line; does the Committee want to send you, or not?"

23. S: I went to this ALEKSENKO, this is ALEKSENKO - and to this SAMARIN - SAMARIN is the Second Deputy, he is Deputy Chairman (Zampredsedatel') - the second one, they have two Deputies now, ALEKSENKO and SAMARIN. I said: "With respect to the Committee line, considering that the journey of the Delegation has been cancelled, can I be of any use?" "Yes, of course, you can prepare. Within these groups there was a group of metallurgists, it will come to you there, we shall apply for visas; one of them is TIKHONOV." TIKHONOV is deputy of ZASYADKO, and ZASYADKO is the Chairman of the GosEkononSoviet of the U.S.S.R. (Government Economic Council of the U.S.S.R.). While TIKHONOV is a metallurgist. He wants to come here for a month or a month and a half with a group, to visit a number of your big metallurgic firms. They should come for ten days - each

of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. When this group of TIKHONOV's was being planned, they wanted to show him the Edgar ALLEN firm and the firms, that is where MERRIMAN and McBRIDE are. And I was ordered to attach MILOVIDOV to the group of TIKHONOV's, when it arrives, and to warn SOLDATOV, i.e. the Ambassador here, the Soviet one, that TIKHONOV is arriving. TIKHONOV is a friend of SOLDATOV's.

33. G: MILOVIDOV is to go on waiting here all the time until they arrive?  
 S: No, MILOVIDOV is leaving when the exhibition closes. G: He will come here afresh then, with TIKHONOV? S: No. Perhaps I will come with TIKHONOV. If TIKHONOV's group were to arrive now, MILOVIDOV would work with them. is general organiser, the Chief. I cannot travel with TIKHONOV, I can only direct (guide) everything and arrange everything, after that they can travel without me - why should I? TIKHONOV was invited by Mr. WEARING who is the Chairman of the Committee of Ferrous Metallurgy E.E.E.K. and he is the Managing Director too of the concern GURST KEEN CO. There is a concern in England, GURST KEEN Co., and the Managing Director of this concern is Mr. WEARING. This WEARING has invited TIKHONOV, when he was in Moscow at the Exhibition. Here I've got written down ARUTYUNOV Nikolay Bagratovich - this is also a member of the Delegation of TIKHONOV. At present, so far, a group has been prepared consisting of seven people. This Nikolay Bagratovich is at present the Head of the Information Directorate within our Committee. ARUTYUNOV. He is also coming. So that so far a group has been prepared in accordance with this decree, and consisting of 7 people.

34. S: I was well instructed in photography. Perhaps there are some flaws. But I am cross with my camera. One of my Minoxes, when I photograph at 45, 46 and to the 50th frame, it goes very stiffly, it pulls. So that I ask you - in my notes here - you see the notation - invite a photographic instructor, I have several questions for him. G: We will do this.

35. S: Now, as regards this group of TIKHONOV's, it will arrive here to you - or rather, we shall ask for visas, and whether you grant them or not is your affair. I think that he should be granted to visit some firm. Perhaps I will come - one cannot tell. TIKHONOV's attitude to me is very pleasant. My stock was raised by GVISHIANI. I swear to you by my daughter - my beloved only one, and her mother - that when I left from here I presented GVISHIANI's wife with some marvellous scent, powder, lipstick, a packet of cards and several packets of cigarettes. I gave presents to everyone, I

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calculated that I had given presents to the value of about £80 - £100. And when I travelled this time - even RUDNEV told me to bring him batteries of 12 volts. These are the Soviet leaders for you in time form! I shall speak to you later in more detail about this.

36. G: How about October and your possibilities for coming? S: As regards October, it's like this: I've just been very cunning. We already applied to the Central Committee with a proposal - I sent it, the third quarter - I passed on via the lady what specialists were being planned. Well - did I work correctly with this lady, or not? H: (in English) You stayed a little bit too long with her. S: Excuse me, I also am a clever man. It's impossible to sit, give and vanish. It is impossible. The lady is sitting, rain is approaching. A pram. She is holding all three children. She is again dressed in the same brown suede jacket, so that I should always recognise her. I appraised the whole set up, the rain is approaching, I on purpose waited for rain to begin, so that as many people as possible should leave. The place is bad. (It would be better) to go further towards the edge there, there would be fewer walkers. She was sitting beside the path opposite the circus and cinema. Everyone goes and sits there, when it is sunny there isn't space for a sardine there! People all round. But further in the square it's empty. The rain was approaching, I thought: let the first drops fall, then I'll approach her.

37. S: (Goes on to describe contact, says lady had no news for him and was not there the following Sunday, the 9th, although he would have had a message for her, as GVISHIANI had already informed him on July 4th that he, S., was ordered to London, and he could have passed this message on via the girl; he goes on to say that she had understood him despite his bad English, only MERRILMAN does not understand him! He will improve his English. He goes on to say that the British need not have feared the intervention of the Militia, as he, S., has his red book, and would have told the Militiaman "shove off, scum", would have let the girl go and then he himself discussed the matter with the Militiaman. The British are the leaders and mentors here, but over there he knows what to do. Goes on to describe departure of lady with pram and 3 children, and that he noted that all was well).

38. S: And how could I know that all was well? You could only inform me of this by wireless in a week's time. Now that you have passed in the message to me the fact that the carbon was wrong, I read the whole thing correctly, yes? G: Yes, yes, it was perfect. S: Without errors. And on Saturday, the day before yesterday, you sent me the same message. What for? On Saturday I again received 41 groups - what for? What do I need it for? G: Because .. S: I don't understand! G: Of course you understand. Just think. Every Saturday and Sunday during the course of a month this is being sent to you the chance to listen whenever best for you. S: And do you think that I would not have listened for it at once? G: (Explains again why repeat messages are sent). S: (Goes on to explain that he has made some three mistakes in decoding but found the errors. Does not find it too difficult. Nor does he find receiving too difficult. Before his departure he hid everything in a secret place (tainik), having first packed it all up. Complains again about receiving the same cyphered message of 41 groups twice. Reverts to his contact with the woman and calls her a heroine - she was most natural, didn't even start. Says it was quite correct and natural that he should have chatted to the children - otherwise why should he have approached at all? etc. It is explained to him that it was all right once, but would not be a good thing often, if they have to use her again, the briefer the better. Subject says it would be better to meet further left in future, as there are less people there - not by the kiosks).

39. S: Now there is another question: why don't you - well, I go to receptions, to the Canadian Embassy regularly, as you know, the Americans don't invite me to the Embassy, although I have already met Americans - the patent chaps came for a visit, 6 of them; a furrier came for a visit, about whom I wrote to you. I also got acquainted with some other American. And no-one invites me! And I'm the deputy head of a section - there was the

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big American day, I thought I would be at the reception, when there were several thousands present, but I wasn't invited! (J. explained to him that the American Embassy called his organisation and asked for a guest list, his name was not on it). S: Well, perhaps that's because I'm young and a new worker. (Agrees that this is the best way to issue invitations, remarks that he has also never been once at the British Embassy, as yet, but has been thrice at the Canadian Embassy). The Ambassador Smith, his wife, three children, FURTSEVA was there, RUDNEV was there, and I was there too. So I go to the Canadian Embassy. As regards the American and British Embassies - I'm quite clear about it now. But perhaps that will also develop gradually.

40. As regards the lady, we've finished that. I request that she takes up her position in future further away from populous places. G: Now that you know her, the matter is quite different. H: Now that she is in England, you can meet her here in a short while. S: Now I have an idea - I would ask you to analyse this matter and solve it scientifically. Why should this lady not be invited to the Canadian Embassy, say, to a reception, so that I could become officially acquainted with her at the reception? Then I could meet her quite openly in the street, as I would come up to Ambassador Smith, if I saw him in the street, for a chat, never mind if there are 100 militiamen present! (It is agreed that such a meeting could be arranged).

41. G: (Explains which carbons should be used for S/W, of those now in S.'s notebook). S: I have written a strip in invisible ink there. I copied it out of there, but all the other formulae I have also here in ink on the slip of paper I sent you. (He had not written through the carbon, but the neighbouring sheet of paper). S: When you gave me the black notebook, there was a black partition sheet ..... and you told me, the three sheets lying behind it are the carbons, three in a row. G: No, no..... they were the second, fourth and sixth. S: I didn't understand that. .... When I asked for a large sheet like that, you gave it to me to begin with, and then you withdrew it. You told me: there is the cover, then there is a black sheet, an insertion, the first three sheets after that are all carbons .... I opened it, took out the first sheet, put it underneath, wrote very clearly - I sent a copy later - it was used later - everything turns out well for me, thank goodness I didn't destroy the carbon, I wrote through this sheet of paper, and I reckoned that the two sheets that remained were also carbons. You told me - all three sheets are carbons. G: .... the real carbons were the 2nd, 4th and 6th sheets. The 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and so on are not carbons. S: And why is this so? G: It is to protect the carbons. .... So I informed you by radio: you did not write with that one, the first; take the following one, because I knew that your No.2 was a carbon. S: When I get home I'll re-arrange them so that I have the carbons one after the other, so I don't mix them up. (They go on repeating the same thing over again). I copied from there, but all other designations and formulae I have destroyed. So I have such a strip left - and why? Because on the opposite side - I didn't re-write it for you then, I kept it - and all the rest I've destroyed. (Referring to the slip of paper with notes which he gave us).

42. G: But what was it? S: There were: all the conventional designations which are used in this technique. Then the conclusions from SALKOVSKIY's formula for reactive raw material (reaktivnoe syr'e), there were several formulae. That's it. And I destroyed that, but I left the strip for myself, as I didn't remove the diagram describing the places during a rocket flight. That I kept, I took them, that is the last that I have remaining of all the tens of sheets - almost a hundred sheets - that I copied 'by my own hand', when I was on the courses.

43. S: Yes - how did my documents come out - all right? G: Yes, perfectly. S: The quality is not bad then? G: No. S: I got scared - why had I written - that thing I gave to the lady - four films - I think I stretched the photography to the very last frames. Did you get the materials

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regarding BEKRENEV's lecture? BEKRENEV's lecture turned out well?

G: Yes, very excellent. S: I photographed the second lecture, finished the film, wound it to the dots, started taking out the film, at that moment there was a knock on the door, I moved everything and it all moved onwards from the dot, and I trembled, my heart ached, because afterwards I did not click it fifty times, I had not time to put it back to zero again - I took a new film and put it in, while I hid this one, and continued photographing. And when I got to the 45th still and then to the 50th it was very stiff to turn, I really had to use force. I wanted to change to the other camera that you sent me, to the second one. Here I made notes there as to what I had to do, how it should be greased and such like, and I have questions for him, the photography instructor, let him come to see me. Because when working it's like this - telephone calls - one has to stop - you may have seen, I have even photographed some pages twice, because I wasn't sure whether I had turned the page or not. Is the manual all right, or not?

G: Excellent. S: It was the year 59. The thing is, to get into that larder - G: Where did you get it from? S: From GRU. All GRU.

44. S: Now please write an article for me because I am very busy, and then I'm too tired to write anything for the Soviet Regime. When I received permission to look at the material it was for background for writing some article - that will be my cover story, then I shall open up such larders in the secret section! G: How can you account for the sources of data in such an article? S: Quite simply. We receive masses of open military journals from you, from the British, from the French. I finished two Academies. For the third time I am today on a mission to a foreign country, if I want to be clever, if I am a military strategic intelligence officer, if I absorb like a sponge everything that goes on here, I read, if I work - I am not working on that at present, I should be able to do this but now I have enough other work for the present for the Committee, for GRU, and our basic work - I didn't start in the right order - our basic work, GRU and the Committee. I get tired, I come home and fall into bed, I fall asleep, in the morning I do my gymnastics, eat and go out. And then afterwards I, in order to write something - I had small inventions, I proposed an Artillery angle measuring device, I shall tell you about it in detail later, you know, before, when I burned with the courage of an eagle, I wrote in the papers a little. Why should I not, if I sit down in front of all the material which we get through our Intelligence from you, such as the regulations through Ceylon.

45. S: By the way, how was that list, good, or not - of the agent network? H: All good, yes. S: Aha. We get the materials from there, we shall upset this agent operation as if they did not exist. We get (this) in our Information Directorate (headed by) KARINEVSKIY Lieutenant-General, who received a promotion - did you get the report about so many Generals being promoted? G: We received it.

46. S: Why should an intelligent officer not sit down, draw general conclusions and write about the opinions of the Anglo-Americans, for instance, in regard to artillery. Let us say tanks. But I myself as a General Staff officer, I can take any doctrinal subject, any question of doctrine, chew over it and give my own views in these secret articles in the journals such as VOYENNAYA MYSL and VOYENNIY VESTNIK. G: But won't they ask you "Where is your source?" S: But you must give me the sources - journals - you give me the bibliography - I asked about it. You indicate what I should use. G: You see, they will ask you "Where did you find it?" S: You give me a list of the bibliography regarding that which is printed openly, without the secret stamp, and I will look at all the libraries, all that is superfluous that you give me I will strike out, and will leave in that which is required. Or if you like I will send you a bibliography, and you write me on the theme - on the basis of this bibliography - your expert can write it so that it would appear logical that a 42 years old, (finished) two Academies, travelled abroad, has for eleven years had experience in intelligence, could have done it. G: That would be much better. S: I'll give you the bibliography. G: That would be much better.

S: We have tons of military journals from all countries. G: That is important, if you can say that such exist and you used it as source material.

S: Well, we must come to an agreement during these 21 days. G: If an item of interest is found they may order you to produce the source.

47. S: Well, to begin with I shall review it, I shall write it all down in my working note-book, I shall think it over, don't worry - understand. I shall put in that to which I could have had access. And we do have access, through our intelligence, through secret literature which we steal by means of our agents, and through open literature which you very open-heartedly write! And we have tons of it - like this - right up to the ceiling - journals, just sit down and write! Think, gather everything! Gather it - on the subject of tanks, on artillery, on general views - infantry, and so and so, and so on - aviation - navy and - it would be logical, there is a lot of material. I would ask you to do this, and if I get into print with it once - and you'll get this article! - if it is printed in a journal, they'll say "What is this?" I am on this trip right now - they consider me to be intelligent for their use. Why do they still keep me in spite of my father? You don't know anything about my father, do you?

G: No. But I will inform you if I find out.

48. S: They know that I can work, they taught me, a fool, for many, many years. They say I have initiative, am gifted, quick on the uptake - they expect a return from me. And if there is no return, then they will say: "That means he is slipping, he no longer has a future." I don't care what they say, in any case I shall be with you in two years' time. If at least I have something printed which is only several pages long, an article reflects good thinking, I shall then say: "I have had this printed, I want to produce something else now, I have more thoughts, ideas are coming to me! I must express them" I will tell them that. "I must read what our views are on such and such a subject" - and when I read I take photographs of it all! All those journals which were brought just now - tomorrow you will say to me: excellent chap!" After rockets this goes as No.2 in importance. I value rockets very highly, the information I gave you. I value it very much. These are the originals, that which we studied.

49. G: Will you have access any more to rockets? S: I shall have, I shall have. Yes, I was promised - I spoke with VARENNISOV - I said: "Sergey Sergeevich, I want to write something about anti-tank artillery, like for instance the type which the Americans have."

50. S: By the way, gentlemen, this thing of yours is working, isn't it, because it is very important to have this recorded. I shall just touch on it, later I will go into detail.

51. S: In connection with these events in Germany, Berlin, our Command must pay special attention to anti-tank defence. Special attention. Why? Because two tank armies - armies, that means consisting of regiments, brigades and two corps, that is an army, plus all auxiliaries. Two tank armies on the territory of the East German Republic (DDR). Check it through your other channels - two tank armies, ready for action on the territory of the East German Republic, not taking into account the tank armies, also armies, which are in the second echelon on our territory, in our forces, on the contiguous borders, and also in Czechoslovakia and in Poland.

52. S: And at present KHRUSHCHEV is carrying on a very cunning masked policy with his General Staff; he is putting much emphasis on tank forces. The tanks will have cannons and rockets on them, there will be machine guns on the tanks. So that our task will be to bring our anti-tank artillery to the highest state of perfection now, and to have anti-tank forces in each infantry section. I have in mind bazookas, and so on, and so on. These things must be available. They must be trained daily, like violinists being trained to play the violin, daily. So the troops can use direct fire daily over open sights. If our anti-tank forces will be at a high level, and his massed tank forces advance across the lines of communications, which will inevitably happen - we will talk about this in more detail later - and a very great many tanks will be built in the future. To the detriment of the artillery.

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53. There is a battle going on at present between the Commanders of the Armies - why are you giving so much money to the tanks? While rockets and electronic science should be increased, and so forth. The emphasis is on tanks, emphasis on submarines, rockets. Aviation, that which he showed, that's a spectacle. These aeroplanes exist, they are not yet all in mass production, some are in serial production, but very few. I shall tell you later, of which there are more and of which there are less since that is known to me. For this reason, immediately - the Berlin question, after the signing of the agreement, they want to blockade the approaches with tanks - the whole problem - that we should - if we hit them hard in the teeth - I am saying this now, I'll say it in more detail later - he wishes the nature of these battles to be localized, but we must hit them so hard that they all be destroyed. For this reason the anti-tank forces must be raised to an as yet unheard-of level now. We must increase anti-tank forces, rockets, conventional artillery, bazookas, mines.

54. G: You think the demonstration was intentional? S: Yes, it was a parade, a spectacle. Some of our generals said: "We shan't go to look at this, we want peace, we keep on talking about peace, while there they are giving a demonstration of force." I heard this with my own ears. But these aeroplanes do exist. But the aeroplanes do not as yet equip air armies. Squadrons, so far. G: But do you think there is perhaps this tendency - to show these aeroplanes so that the West should also turn to more aircraft production in competition, and give less attention to rockets, so to speak to appropriate more money for aircraft rather than rockets. S: He would like that, but he does not think that we are as naive as that. He knows that this will not work. G: But do you think that it is possible there was such a tendency? S: No, and in two or three years, those aeroplanes which he demonstrated now and the secrets which he showed, there will be many, many squadrons of them. They will be produced like sausages.

55. S: Tell me, this carbon which I brought, the one I worked on, can something be got out of it with the help of ultra-violet rays? G: No.

56. S: I got your radio message, every word of it. Was it exactly as you said? G: It was perfect, you got the full message. The only slight error was in the abbreviation for beginning. You read it as NASH instead of NACH which makes no difference at all. The message also probably straightened out in your mind that you used the wrong carbon for SW. S: I could have written up the material in overt text just as well but I simply wanted to try out the SW system. By the way did you receive all my filmed materials? G: Yes we did and it all came out fine.

57. S: When I told VARENTSOV that I wanted to write military articles he told me to use his office, that is the office where GORFE sat. You probably read what I wrote about his death when the helicopter crashed? H: Yes, we got that. S: I am just checking to see that you received all my material. It is so good that Mr. KENNEDY and Mr. MacMILLAN have declared such a firm stand, this has created quite a panic there. Later I will go into details but right now we are just expressing general views.

58. G: Now let us consider a matter of the greatest importance for all of us and particularly beginning with the report which you yourself sent to us about the Berlin situation. Possibly you can expand on and clarify many details of your own report; for example who else was present when VARENTSOV made his statement you told us about? S: Gen. Major Andrey Romanovich POZOVNIY with his wife and I was there with my wife Vera and that is all. The occasion was when he invited his very close friends to his dacha for a drink as a consequence of his having received the rank of Chief Marshal. By the way did you get FEDOROV's photograph? H: Yes we did. S: You see the existence of the four brigades was confirmed and I gave you the deployment area of the First Brigade. Storm groups should be organized to prevent these brigades from moving out of the towns where they are. This is something Mr. STRAUSS should work on.

59. H: I think we'd better start on the questions in the proper order. Q: to S: We have an agenda here and the questions have been placed in the proper order of sequence so let me ask you these in order. Here is the first one; what new developments do you know about in the Soviet position on the BERLIN question since the time you last reported? For example, what is the present Soviet position, what action have they taken and what is their plan?

Berlin

60. S: I understand. The Soviet position as I have reported to you is as follows: first of all if it were possible to deploy a huge army on a wide front using only conventional weapons and no rockets with atomic or hydrogen warheads, there would probably be mass defections to our (the West) side. I mention this as a preamble to the situation. Q: Is this your view or do VARENTSOV and others share this view? S: This is a general view because our situation at home is rotten. They don't trust KHRUSHCHEV, they don't trust the Soviet Government and the people remain half hungry as before. The people are very displeased with KHRUSHCHEV's militant speeches and they say this audibly since it is easier to express oneself now that BERIA is gone. The current belief is that, thanks to KHRUSHCHEV's militant speeches, KENNEDY, MACMILLAN and De GAULLE have been forced to increase their armament programmes by two or three times. If STALIN were alive he would do everything quietly but this fool is blurring out his threats and intentions and is forcing our possible potential enemies to increase their military strength. They dislike him and say that he is hurting his own cause and that he talks too much about Soviet military accomplishments in his effort to frighten the Western leaders.

K's attitude - alleged distrust.

61. S: With this thought in the background in the present situation we (the West) do not wish to repeat a second Egyptian fiasco. We should react with firmness if he blocks the access roads to BERLIN, those blocking forces should be smashed and without striking with atomic weapons at industrial centres or rear areas. Should he attempt to do this then he should be repaid in kind and the whole world told that the West is protecting its vital interests which KHRUSHCHEV had trampled upon in violation of the Potsdam Agreement signed after World War II. If he expands the conflict to some degree then he should be answered with corresponding counter blows. Actually KHRUSHCHEV and the Soviet Army at this time are unprepared for this.

62. S: Now, what new developments took place since I last reported? KHRUSHCHEV is personally pressing the Central Committee of the Communist Party in two directions; the first is to establish and perfect a mass production programme of all types of armament, specifically rockets, aviation and other similar means. To implement this the workers of the Central Committee and the responsible Ministers are actually physically present at the respective production centres for which they are responsible. They are, for example, at such cities as GORKI which should be intensively bombed. Near GORKI is a town called SOBKOVO. At this place there are extensive yards where submarines are produced. There are wharves, dry-docks and shipyards there. In addition, before I forget, there is a huge aircraft production centre which is building the Delta type bombers and fighters which you have seen, or maybe you call them swept back wings - this plant is located at DNEPROPETROVSK. Now this area has been declared a forbidden zone for foreigners, even the mines there which were previously visited are closed off because they desire to shut off access to the area.

arm production

WHO?

Gorki/Sobkovo

Dnepropetrovsk

Aug 1954

DDR part in large field units

63. S: What are they doing militarily? My old friend Marshal VARENTSOV is constantly travelling to the countries of Peoples' Democracies. Just prior to my departure to come here the extensive manoeuvres in Bulgaria were completed. Here is the way manoeuvres are now conducted. In every tank army and in every field army, that is mostly an infantry formation, one Division from the D.D.R. is included. The exercises are conducted just as large scale formations are trained but fully participating and fully equipped, one Division per Army from the D.D.R. also participates.

Q: What type of Division is it? S: It is a standard D.D.R. Infantry Division which operates exactly as Soviet doctrine prescribes, and trains with the Soviet Army at all manoeuvres. Q: Where does this take place? Is it with the Soviet Army only in the D.D.R. or elsewhere in addition? S: The German Division is included in the Soviet Army wherever the Soviet Army may run manoeuvres. This means it may take place in any country of the Warsaw Pact and also within the U.S.S.R. itself. This is a new measure which is designed to train the D.D.R. Army in tactics and strategy for joint operations.

DDR  
Joint  
training

Joint  
exercises

64. Q: How about Divisions of other Satellite countries? S: Shortly after I left you extensive manoeuvres took place in Czechoslovakia which involved Soviet, Czech and D.D.R. troops which were training for joint operations. Marshal VARENTSOV was there and all of the Marshals of the respective arms of service. Therefore satellite armed forces are being trained for joint operations. The last big manoeuvre just ended in Bulgaria. FEDOROV went to KAPUSTIN YAR with one rocket battalion in June for training. When I saw him he told me that when the Soviet forces in case of hostilities have to deploy and leave their garrison positions in the D.D.R., they will have to combat all Germans. The enlisted personnel of the D.D.R. Army are very hostile to us. The top brass is well disposed to the Soviet Army because they are well taken care of, just as their top political leaders. However, the enlisted men simply hate us and if we can't deploy in time they will beat us down with stones and rifles, and they will execute all kinds of sabotage. I wrote this up for you already. In other words if communications were out, the isolated units would be trapped. I did not give you all these details for lack of space, so I want to tell you about it orally.

GW Br. from  
GSSG training at  
K.V.

DDR troops  
hostile to Sov.  
no general inf.

65. S: FEDOROV told me that the existing supply dumps for artillery were not adequate for storing rockets and that larger protective storage structures were constructed. These were both higher and longer than normal structures and could be easily spotted. There are so many German spies in the area that not only did they detect the rocket storage units but in a number of cases sabotage by puncturing the rocket shells took place. I wrote about this, upon filling the rockets with fuel, extensive leaks were discovered and these rockets were sabotaged to make them impossible to use. FEDOROV said that diversionist spies sent by West Germany were responsible for this. FEDOROV also said that since the Soviet Government will not allocate funds to rebuild artillery dumps, improvised shelters must be constructed and these are impossible to camouflage. Q: Were there many cases of this kind? S: He told me that there were two or three cases of sabotage in his brigade. Similar cases were found in other brigades and he again repeated to me that there are four rocket brigades in the territory of the D.D.R. Q: When did this take place? S: Only recently, in May.

Storage dump  
artillery

Training  
rocket

in DDR in 1954

66. S: Another thing I want you to check which I have reported is that in addition to KAPUSTIN YAR, Soviet rocket forces deploy near ODESSA, where this aeroplane crash I wrote about took place, have impact areas in Rumania and in Poland and they are test firing at those areas. The exact location from where rocket firing takes place is not known but it is from the ODESSA Military District. Another important bit of information told to me by Colonel BUZINOV, who is now the A.D.C. to Marshal VARENTSOV, is that joint operations in various types of military manoeuvres will take place throughout the entire year. Satellite armed forces will participate in these manoeuvres and the particular emphasis is to develop the combat readiness of the units belonging to the D.D.R.

W/c. crash  
firing range  
ODESSA - Rumania  
- Poland

Joint exercises  
esp. DDR  
Combat readiness

67. S: Before going to the next question, I must say that VARENTSOV looked extremely worn and haggard when I saw him that Sunday, and in addition to the burden of responsibilities as Chief Marshal he shortly expects to be the Commander in Chief of all rockets in the U.S.S.R. They expect to replace MALINOVSKY as the Minister of Defense by GRECHKO. GRECHKO's Deputy will be MOSKALENKO, and VARENTSOV will be in charge of all rocket forces, that is, not only will he have the rockets and artillery of the ground forces of which he is now the Chief, but in addition he will be in command of the joint Headquarters of tactical rockets and strategic

Expected  
Command  
changes

Grechko

Ex-pro-12  
Circumstances  
Change

rockets which are now under MOSKALFNKO. I wrote this up for you; and there will be some twelve Directorates in this new combined Headquarters which will be all under VARENTSOV. He will also be in charge of PRKIUUSHKOVO I told you about. This has been given to VARENTSOV even though the Minister dislikes him and many Marshals are envious of him. Quite frankly, though I have a great personal regard for him, he is not a deep thinker and has educational limitations. However, he is one of the best artillery men and they want him to be in charge of both tactical and strategic rockets.

68. S: to G: You will give me a plus for this, I just remembered that I found a classified article by your friend Lieut.Gen. KOCHETKOV. It deals with the creation of an operational directorate in G.R.U. I remember last meetings I was not very convincing in my explanation of this directorate. (S. misread title of article which actually spoke of the eliminations of inefficiency in operational intelligence and military intelligence, and not on the creation of an operational directorate). In addition there are a number of other very important articles here including those by VARENTSOV and ODINTSOV and other prominent military leaders. I am very happy that the photography came out clearly. H: This is a special issue of articles in VOENNAIA MYSL. Are these more secret than the ordinary issues?  
S: This is absolutely Top Secret and I will now find the sheet on which the classification is clearly indicated. (S. continues for some time to examine and to remark upon the articles which he had photographed).

Special  
Very important  
topical articles

69. S: Publications of a Top Secret nature previously issued by the various branches of service are no longer handled in that manner. They are now incorporated in a group of articles and published in a Top Secret special issue of VOENNAIA MYSL and in VOENNIY VESTNIK. I have photographed a number of these articles in toto and those were the ones which seemed to me most important. If you will examine the table of contents please tell me what others you wish photographed in their order of priority. (S. read all of the article titles and list of authors and emphasized that these articles reflected the current thinking and military doctrine of the Soviet Army. He also noted that enquiries or remarks concerning any of these articles must be submitted directly to the editor of the publication only through classified control channels).

Current  
Secret  
military  
thinking

70. S: I request that you have all this translated and turn the material over to your military commanders since the substance of these articles is of significant current importance. Even the word rocket is used here, not the camouflage word assembly of some kind or other and you will also note that there are now types of rockets with their designations described here. What I would like to do with all of the materials that I have passed to you is to re-examine them after you have processed them and have prepared a list of questions requiring clarification. At the same time I will be able to check the quality of my own photography.

Rockets  
new types (?)  
classification

71. G: What did you say that the position of General POZOVNIY was who was with you when VARENTSOV made his statement? S: He was the former Deputy to VARENTSOV for political matters. Now Deputy to BIRYUZOV.

Pozovnyy  
Political H.Q.  
no.

72. (S. insisted on showing an article which included military estimates of the NATO Powers' military weapons to indicate what their intelligence was able to produce. While reading S. emphasized that he spotted three new rockets, the R-30, R-170 and the R-300, remarking that the R-300 designation was equated to the range of 300 kilometres. S. also referred to tables of western powers, specifically U.S. rocket capabilities for a given sector of combat operations. The numbers of available rocket weapons of various calibres and the rate of fire was indicated. S. stated that these tables should be checked for accuracy and if Soviet information was correct then deliberate changes should be introduced in order to offset Soviet calculations of MOZh [Mathematical expectancy]. S. also mentioned that anti-missile missiles and their inclusion in a co-ordinated radar search net were described in one of the articles).

R30  
170  
300

ABM

73. G: By the way how much time do you have available today? S: We still have time to work yet. G: We are concerned about your pattern of life here. Do you have to report to anyone? S: No. I am living all alone in a small neat room and I have not seen any other Soviets there. As you see from my documents I am my own chief and I can develop my business relations here with PAVLOV who is the acting Resident during the absence on leave of the Resident. I don't have to report to him. I have been assigned my own missions which I will attempt to fulfil and you may help me to fulfil some of them. All I need to do is to come back with a record of having accomplished my missions for both G.R.U. and the G.N.T.K. I have not yet told you about the G.R.U. missions but I will do so later and with your help I think I can accomplish all my missions.

74. S: The information I obtained on my last trip was favourably received, even though they did not use MERRIDMAN I don't care. I saw GENERALOV recently while he was in MOSCOW. He told me that he had called MERRIDMAN but could not reach him and when he did reach him MERRIDMAN told him that he was busy. Possibly you gave MERRIDMAN instructions that he should not go to a meeting. H: MERRIDMAN says that he has never heard anything from them. G: Did GENERALOV actually speak to MERRIDMAN? S: He was told by MERRIDMAN that he was too busy, but why could he not have turned over the materials he promised me that he would get? These were just the overt materials that we had all agreed he would get for me and pass them through GENERALOV. H: Simply because MERRIDMAN has not heard anything from GENERALOV at all. S: We shouldn't use such old men. He said in my presence in unmistakable English that even I could understand that he would get these materials for me. G: The point is MERRIDMAN says that no-one has called him on the phone. S: GENERALOV told me he called. G: One thing is clear, either MERRIDMAN is a liar or GENERALOV is a liar. S: Let's check into this because I received credit for having turned a man over for contact, but how they use him after that I couldn't care less.

75. G: Your present situation is now clearer but there will be days when you have to make an appearance somewhere, possibly to visit PAVLOV or go to the Embassy, and sometimes this could be in the evening. S: Yes, and on some days we will have to work during the daytime. On certain days I should be in my room in the evening and on other days I should meet with Soviets, but particularly since at this time there are many intelligence people in London, for example while I was on my way to see WYNN I ran into VORONIN. In MOSCOW he was the chief of a NAFRAVLENIY in Strategic Intelligence under General SOKOLOV. Tomorrow I will meet him at nine o'clock and we will have a talk. G: Is he here on a mission? S: Yes, he has his own mission and there are a lot of intelligence officers that you have permitted to come here, particularly a large number of the neighbours. They are watching our people at the exhibition. G: Did he come as a member of a delegation from Lt.Col. ROGOV's to which you belong? S: No, he was sent here on a special assignment independently.

76. G: Let me continue now with questions on BERLIN so we can cover this subject. S: Very well.

77. G: This is an important question. What is the degree of confidence of VARENTSOV and other high ranking Soviet military officers regarding the readiness of Soviet forces to meet the consequences of KHRUSHCHEV's BERLIN policy? That is, if physical resistance develops? S: That is a very important question. If we consider today's situation the Soviet Army is not ready for any widespread war. VARENTSOV said there is no confidence that our forces are prepared. I even wrote you this and VARENTSOV said specifically that in going forward this way we are proceeding to a definite risk. We are preparing our troops and training them to be ready for any eventuality, but at this time there is no confidence that they are prepared. G: Did VARENTSOV say that? S: Yes, he said that. They are trying to establish this confidence, the Central Committee members, the various Party members and the Ministers are all at the production centres to develop the needed equipment preparedness and the Marshals and Generals are constantly with troops to develop their combat efficiency. As an example, during the manoeuvres in ODESSA Military District look at how many Generals perished there.

Berlin ✓

investigation  
on readiness  
for war

production

efforts

78. G: How do they regard the military feasibility of containing the military conflict within the D.D.R.? S: This is a purely adventurist concept. They plan to block all roads of access through the D.D.R. to BERLIN with tank forces. Of course the first echelon of forces will be East German troops and back of them in a second echelon support role will be Soviet troops. As soon as this barrier is smashed then additional reinforcing troops will be brought up. The entire plan involves co-ordinated action on the part of East German and Soviet troops. The thinking is that if these reinforced troops can strongly repulse the Anglo-American, French and West German forces then these will abandon further conflict and negotiate with the East German Government in order to obtain transit to BERLIN. Further conflict will then be avoided and the Soviet thinking is that the Western powers will be afraid of further conflict. The Soviet estimates are that the West German Army is not prepared for conflict and specifically they are considered to be 80% of strength in equipment and manpower.

79. G: What sources are there to whom you attribute this thought? S: My sources are Sergei Sergeievich and, write down, KUPIN. KUPIN is now the Commander of artillery in a tank army in the D.D.R. M: Did you see him at VARENTSOV'S? S: Yes, I did and he has just arrived in MOSCOW and he will be the artillery commander of the MOSCOW Military District, replacing General POLKOVNIK of Artillery ILKACHEV who is being retired and, as I told you before, KUPIN'S nephew GONCHAREV is married to YERILINA, VALENTSOV'S daughter. G: So they are relatives. S: KUPIN has not received this position yet but the Central Committee has already approved it. His headquarters will be right near my house and he will visit me and I hope to be able to get much good information from him.

80. G: Do you think that the Soviet forces are ready for general nuclear war and what is the estimate of Soviet officers that such a war may develop out of the BERLIN situation? S: They do not want an atomic war but local atomic strikes are possible since they say they have what to spit with, but in so far as covering important military centres or concentration points they do not have the capability and for this reason KHRUSHCHEV is fighting for peace.

81. G: Therefore what would you say about the position of the preparedness of Soviet forces for nuclear war? S: They are not ready. KHRUSHCHEV'S statements about this are all bluff, but he is preparing as fast as possible. Certain evidences are to be seen. Near where I live are offices of the RAYVOYENKOMAT who belong to the organization and mobilization Directorate and they are beginning to re-examine discharged officers. This is specifically restricted to engineer officers of all categories and other technical officers such as Signal Corps men, etc. In other words, the local military officers have received an order from the main organization and mobilization directorate of General Staff to re-examine all discharged technical officers and to place them on active duty.

82. G: Where did VARENTSOV himself acquire his information on the subject? Was it from official documents or from meetings within the Ministry? S: He got that from the Supreme Military Council where KHRUSHCHEV sits as Chairman and the active voices are usually KOZLOV and MLKOYAN. The other members of the Praesidium are silent. These three are pressing and demanding that the German question be resolved by signing the D.D.R. Peace Treaty and that this matter can not be put off any longer because the U.S.S.R. would then be in a laughable position before the whole world.

83. S: The D.D.R. is nothing, they are only a vassal, they say that if we do not do this now the future generations will not forgive us because we have talked so much about signing this and did not do it. At this time they feel a certain amount of military strength, although this is far from having the capability of covering all military targets with atomic weapons. The reasoning is simply this, to strike one sharp blow, let a little blood flow and the Americans and British will be frightened and withdraw. This is what he is banking on, but if he received a severe counter blow then maybe he would sing another tune, at the same time you know what a bad morale factor the Soviet Army and population have. This you know from other sources not only from me.

84. Q: If this happens what does he think will happen to KHRUSHCHEV?  
 S: He would be in an untenable position and may have to withdraw. This POZOVNIY told me. Q: Would KHRUSHCHEV be removed? S: No. They could have removed him a hundred times before this. First of all it would be a loss in prestige and secondly there is no-one adequate to replace him. KOZLOV is of little consequence and there are no people like MOTILOV and MALINOV available. KHRUSHCHEV is a fresh man, a politician and a Party man. Q: In other words he will just pull his horns in but will still remain the chief. S: Yes.

85. S: By the way I wish you would pass to your military leaders the substance of these articles because none of them contain any foolishness or flippant material. The authors are of such stature that any article of little consequence would reflect seriously against them. I particularly request that you call to the attention of your military leaders the great significance that is now being given to the expansion of Soviet tank forces. Such a great significance is now given to tank forces and a tank army does have tremendous striking power. You must increase your anti-tank weapons significantly as well as build up your own tank forces.

86. Q: Who brought up the conversation on the BERLIN situation when you were with VARENTSOV? S: I will tell you exactly how it happened. Although I was burning with desire to ask about this it actually happened like this. First of all everyone had a few drinks and my wife quite innocently said "Sergei Sergeievich, looking at things from the viewpoint of a woman and a mother do you think we will sign the Peace Treaty with East Germany?" He said "Yes, this will be done" and later when we separated from the ladies together with POZOVNIY and myself he spoke of it freely himself and both POZOVNIY and I had interest in this matter so we furthered the conversation, but to be perfectly honest it was brought up earlier by my wife.

87. Q: What is the opinion of VARENTSOV, that is does he agree with KHRUSHCHEV's view regarding what the Western powers will do? S: I can tell you exactly what he told POZOVNIY and myself. He even cursed and said "We are definitely embarking on a risky action". He mentioned that KHRUSHCHEV is prepared to reinforce the original clash with considerable reinforcements by tank forces. But he does not want the war to spread further. He realises that the NATO powers have strong nuclear capabilities, but he is relying on the assumption that they would not use nuclear weapons in the first phases of such a conflict. If KHRUSHCHEV had such capabilities his concept would be to launch an all-out initial smashing blow. But he does not have this and I have heard this view expressed many times by many officers on the General Staff. The people do not want to fight for anything in East Germany. In addition, we are subsidizing with billions the black African peoples and are constantly being visited by their leaders and the attitude is why do two things at once?

88. Q: What do the other high-ranking officials think of this?  
 S: The high ranking officials including VARENTSOV, who is also a big man, realise that we have certain strengths but that in many respects we are not ready for a prolonged conflict, but they simply give orders to produce, to support and to execute orders and they have no choice but to do it; if they refuse they will be removed. Whether they agree or not they have to do it. To keep their positions and not get thrown out they would sell their souls to the devil. For example, you remember the time when VARENTSOV was not a Chief Marshal and was criticising KHRUSHCHEV here and there. Now at his party since he has become a Chief Marshal he raised his glass and offered a toast to the health of Nikita Sergeievich. I fell back, I raised my glass, but what the hell would I drink to him for? I thought of you and drank to your health. Now, of course, VARENTSOV is pleased with him and is willing to produce all the rocket forces available and he is particularly pleased at becoming a Commander in Chief of all rocket forces, tactical and strategic. Of course, all people are human and when one receives these great distinctions and power one will use this power and now VARENTSOV is favourably disposed towards KHRUSHCHEV.

89. S: But everyone knows how KHRUSHCHEV is lying when he says that we have caught up with America in milk production and in meat when for meat

- 20)

they are slaughtering rabbits and horses.

90. H: And who was there when the actual ceremony took place?  
 J: If he can reconstruct in detail how it all happened.... Who else was there with you - just POZOVNYY and his wife? S: I will tell you again. After he had received his promotion, a whole month and a half elapsed before we could congratulate him as he was absent from MOSCOW, let alone give him the customary toasts. And he himself felt that he must have a party with his close friends, and also invited Col. General ZHIMNOV, The Chief of GAU - but he was away in LENINGRAD at the time and was not there with his wife. Therefore what happened was that one day Ekaterina Karpovna rang up my wife, I myself not being at home but in my office at the time, and left a message saying that he should keep Sunday free as we want you to come to lunch with us at the dacha that day?

91. S: The same message-order was given to POZOVNYY through Iyana Alekseevna, his wife. His car...by the way he has been given a ZIM again as a Chief-Marshal, whereas before he has a...not a Volga...not a Chaika...no, wait a minute only that Marshal has a Chaika...no, a ZIM.... VARENTSOV hasn't got a Chaika. Only the Minister, The deputy-Minister and the Chief of General Staff have a Chaika...SEROV hasn't got a Chaika either, he has a ZIM too...I have all the numbers of these cars...The message went on to say: "the car will call for you then you will drive over to SOKOL to pick up the POZOVNYYs". And this is what we did. POZOVNYY and his wife, myself and my wife, VARENTSOV and his wife, their daughters Yerlem and little Natasha and my daughter Galya.

92. S: After the meal was over, they left the table, the children are fifteen years old. Discussion began on various matters, we drank, he also made a complimentary toast to me; and so we drank...but it was all a question of feminine psychology, you understand, the women do not want war. So my wife asked "Sergei Sergeievich, but will the agreement be signed - now?" And he replied "Yes, it will be signed!" The subject was dropped then, however. After we had drunk some more, we got up from the table. We had drunk well, vodka, cognac, wine... and then we returned to the German problem, this time on my initiative, taking advantage of the lead which my wife had achieved on her own...I hadn't asked her to do so...this is of course only a detail, but again perhaps an important one...and he went on to speak as I have already reported to you. G: When was this? S: On Sunday June 25.

93. G: But did POZOVNYY have any opinions on this? S: Yes, he did. POZOVNYY actually saw me off the day before yesterday. I gave him a present of my spectacles which WINNE bought for me when I was over in Birmingham, as he had no spectacles. We said goodbye and as I was going on this trip I invited him to a meal at a restaurant. Well, after we had eaten we had a little chat. He also swears at KHRUSHCHEV, he swears at him a lot in fact, for his adventurist policy. He actually meets man; generals since he sits with BIRYUZOV, the Commander of the PVO of the land. He expressed many opinions, both his own and those of other people.

94. G: But for what reason do these other criticize KHRUSHCHEV?  
 S: They are swearing at KHRUSHCHEV because he is making such a row when everything is yet far from ready and he may result in starting such a conflagration and we will get such a kick in the pants that blood will flow from our people...! This is why they are swearing at him! After all, the generals are taking a wider view of things, more especially as POZOVNYY himself is a political chief, a political worker in the Soviet Army.

95. G: Of course, he couldn't have told you such things in VARENTSOV's presence. S: of course not, but I must tell you however that POZOVNYY has often enough spoken to VARENTSOV in this vein, and often VARENTSOV agreed with him even. On various aspects and various problems. These are various details for which I can vouch [sign for] in my own blood! I can open a vein or an artery, which ever you please. Anyway gentlemen, there can be no doubts whatsoever on this, otherwise we will find it very difficult to work together or to agree.

96. G: But do you consider this may be a dangerous situation for KHRUSHCHEV, i.e. if things came to a negative situation do you think the top brass will begin to shout that he had dragged them into the mess? S: Yes, they could. G: And even remove him [KHRUSHCHEV]? S: Yes, they could remove him. Or alternatively, they could leave him - if they feel that the Anglo-American Bloc is really prepared to hit out not once but several times kick us in the teeth in localized areas and even warn us that they are prepared to go outside the localized areas and hit us on a wider scale even - than KHRUSHCHEV may postpone his fixed time limit. What will happen will be that ULLARICHT will say something, KHRUSHCHEV will support him, some dogma will be found and once again he will say "O.K. we'll talk about it later - anyway truth is on our side!" Something of this nature may take place.

97. S: But there is a final point I would like to make, even though it is clear to you, and it is my duty to point out as a high ranking officer of the General Staff that if this time we come down from our positions and do not show firmness, then KHRUSHCHEV's position will be very much strengthened. All the peoples of the world will believe in him more and more and he will dictate his will in many other questions also. I myself am against that we (the West) should be the first to embark on wide scale conflict as this would be an error from the point of view of world opinion and also we would be doing this without proper preparedness. If it is decided to go ahead then one should go full steam ahead determined on a total destruction - as I have already told you in April/May. If not, then show firmness - to kick him in the teeth once or twice so as to stop him short! Or alternatively to prepare oneself on such a wide scale, that he will see that before he can even start anything he will have suffered complete ruination.

98. G: But do you consider that this represents VARENTSOV's own personal feelings or did he get this view from some sort of conference? S: This is not result of a conference but purely because VARENTSOV knows the truth of the matter. VARENTSOV knows how many rockets there are available. VARENTSOV knows what there is now. VARENTSOV knows what is possible and what is not. VARENTSOV knows the sum total of what we have available, what is available now and what the potential is for the future. VARENTSOV bases himself on a true knowledge of our actual truthful position as it in fact is and not what they are always saying it is. Although they may know just as well what VARENTSOV knows. As far as I know VARENTSOV and as I see the situation and which as a responsible person I must report to my Government, High Command and to you (since I am now talking to you as living responsible persons), VARENTSOV bases his evaluation of the situation on the knowledge of the actual true facts of our position.

99. G: But does he more or less support KHRUSHCHEV in this? or does he think that...? S: No, he does not support him and these are VARENTSOV's words: "We are going ahead at great risk" [idem in risk]; He (VARENTSOV) is taking into consideration the factual reality of the situation and it may well be possible that VARENTSOV's views coincide with the views held by ROTMISTROV, ZHAIKOV, KOROCUKIN and GRECHKO. He did not detail this so I cannot quote him, but the way I get the impression, judging him as an experienced person, I would say to you that if VARENTSOV knew that he had available 10,000 atomic missiles of various yields, he would have said "Oh, that is sufficient for us to cover the bases in Turkey, Iran, in the North etc." But VARENTSOV knows well that such is not the case, that he has not got these available, that they are just only still in the stage of manufacture, still in the stage of planning. VARENTSOV knows what he has available and he knows that a blow could be struck - but could this blow be taken to its logical conclusion? This is what VARENTSOV is not sure of, he has doubts because he has not got all this available.

100. G: Do you think your Intelligence organs have sufficient data on our war preparedness etc.? Are they really in a position to evaluate our strength? Or are they only relying on Western intentions? S: This is an excellent question. Here the point of view of the chiefs of Intelligence, as well as that of my colleagues in Intelligence and myself is that we have exact knowledge of the true military position (of the West), in certain respects. We have, for example, exact knowledge as regards the status of F.R.G.

*Intelligence from intelligence*

military strength. Here, Intelligence has obtained exact information. Strategic Intelligence, through its special illegal agencies and other means, has obtained knowledge of the location of all vulnerable places in the system of defence and war-preparedness. Although these data are not complete, there are certain sources of information which strengthen KHRUSHCHEV and his Government in their views. His policies are therefore not entirely based on simple "nopal'stvo" [arrogance]! KHRUSHCHEV bases himself on real factors of which he does not know all the details and on this he bases all his insolence and firmness.

101. Q: With respect to the intentions of the West, as far as BERLIN is concerned, can the Intelligence Organs give KHRUSHCHEV any positive data?  
 S: Yes, but not fully. It can report to KHRUSHCHEV that it is known exactly that the F.R.G. military units are of 80% strength in manpower and equipment. This is the figure given by Intelligence - 80%, not 70% or 75% but 80%! Therefore, judge for yourselves! Does this look as though Soviet Intelligence has got exact data which it supplies to KHRUSHCHEV, or does Soviet Intelligence mislead him with the information they provide? This is for you to check and to decide. And another thing: Intelligence information is provided not only by Strategic Intelligence Organs, but also by the Intelligence Organs of all Socialist countries. I must tell you that on any day that I went into G.H.Q. in Gorki Street, every time without fail I would meet there some representative or other of a country from the Socialist camp; whether in uniform or in civilian clothes, but I could see perfectly well it was a foreigner... a Hungarian, Rumanian, or Bulgarian. Every single time, all the time, there they were, with their brief-cases and assigned cars. Because as a result of the WARSAW Agreement, a constant, serious, intensive and wide-spread preparation is taking place and a tight control has been introduced to unify patterns of training and joint operations. Not a day passed without my running into one of these characters, walking in or out of all the various Directorates. Therefore the factual situation is revealed in all its exactitude, but I would add that it is not complete nor is it in any great depth. For instance the Intelligence supplied by Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria is much more exact than the information supplied by the Hungarians. Their information is supplied in more detail and, on checking, proved to be more correct. Because all intelligence under BREZNEV is coordinated and all data is put together and evaluated.

102. Q: Have you noticed that there is an intensifying in the tasks set to Intelligence in connection with BERLIN?  
 S: Yes. I must tell you that for instance the Soviet Mission in West BERLIN is composed entirely out of officers of Strategic Intelligence. For instance, Lt. Col. Petr GORNELOV who was at the Academy with me, we both finished in 1955. He is not there now actually, he is on leave in MOSCOW. Recently we went together to the restaurant 'Aravvi' and he told me how the Americans had stopped him several times. You know they wear Soviet uniform, they are not in civilian clothes, this is the Soviet Military Mission in West BERLIN, so, he told me how the Americans stopped him and told him: "You are in the wrong zone" and GORNELOV replies: "Gentlemen, open the map and look at it, I have perfect right to be here, in these particular streets". But the Americans insist "No, you are not in your zone" and they surrounded him, but he showed firmness and after looking at the map, it turned out that GORNELOV was in his rights after all and had not infringed any regulations which would allow him to be accused of provocation. But such provocations do happen and they (the Soviet Mission) are working there now full steam ahead. They are all from the Strategic Intelligence.

103. Q: Do they busy themselves with determining the mood of the people and all that?  
 S: Yes, all that. What I would like to point out is that - in our actions, there must be an element of sober and conscious preparation, our actions must show assurance /confidence and, on top of that, we must also introduce into our actions a slight element of adventurism so that we could drum it into his skull and disorientate him (KHRUSHCHEV). For instance, you bring in a tank Regiment, but it should be announced to be a whole Division. Well, let Intelligence search like mad to find the other Regiments of the Division - where can they be. But let all the Soviet people know, let all the peoples-signatories of the WARSAW Pact realise that the Americans, English, French and Germans of the F.R.G. are ready to meet seriously and stand firm against this provocation regarding West BERLIN and the intention to subjugate West BERLIN - that is as clear as black on white.

Let it be clear that (the West) will stand firm and are prepared to strike a blow of destruction, but they do not want to be the first to strike, so that all the peoples should see who is the real aggressor and who is the defender of truth!

104. G: But did you not gather from your brother officers in the D.D.R. that they have been given new missions and they find conditions of work there more difficult now and that they have more tasks to fulfill etc. S: Yes, I did discuss this matter. Conditions of work were always difficult there, their task is: to find out exactly what the Americans, English and French are doing. That is their most active task, the one that is drummed into their skulls daily and on which definite results are demanded. Not only demanded but they are under constant pressure for results. All sorts of information is demanded; what new units have appeared and where, what are their numbers and designation, what type of units - whether artillery, engineering or Air Force.

Khoroshelev  
Edov  
Kostik  
Egorov  
etc. etc.

105. G: How about the popular views and reactions? S: They are also being studied. I can also give you the views of FEDOROV and the views of KHOROSHELEV. You know, KHOROSHELEV, not VOYKOSHELEV, but KHOROSHELEV Jurij - he also studied at the KIEV Artillery School where I did, but he finished a year before me. I finished in 1939 and he in 1938. After that he was Instructor under ODINTSOV at the Academy and later he commanded a Brigade of conventional Artillery. Now he is chief of Staff under KUPIN who is the present Artillery Commander of a Tank Army, but KUPIN is leaving; KHOROSHELEV however, will remain C.O.S. of Artillery of the Tank Army. I saw him in MOSCOW recently, we had a meal at restaurant 'DINAMO', he invited me; he has his own MOSKOVICH car, he came to collect me. And his views are as follows - this is what he told me; they are going to shoot us down, these Germans of ours, like partridges, if we do not take up a circular defence position so that we could pulverise everybody". And these are exactly the views held by FEDOROV. And I was very glad that these two colonels should have such confidence in me, and they know me well, since 1937 KHOROSHELEV knows me and FEDOROV also has known me for many years and respects me, and loves me as a friend, our families meet often. And FEDOROV told me that in September will begin the mass evacuation of (Soviet) families from the G.D.R. in expectation of whatever may happen next, and FEDOROV should know because he has his wife Shurochka there and two children a boy and a girl; the boy goes to school 15 kms. away from where FEDOROV's brigade is located [Comment: WILHELMSTRASSE, school is in NAUMBERG].

families  
evacuated  
in Sep  
from 1944

106. G: Do they consider that in a protracted conflict the D.D.R. forces will run away, over to the West? S: This is a second point. The first thing they spoke to me about was the attitude of the ordinary (East) Germans - the civilians, not the army - and this mood is bad. As regards the armies of the D.D.R., they expressed a very low opinion of its organization and its commander - what the hell is his name - (they consider) he is a very mediocre person (Commanding General D.D.R. forces). As regards the D.D.R. officers, they said "We are not sure of them, they can turn either way". As regards the ordinary soldier, they didn't express any definite opinion and I didn't ask. But this man, the General commanding D.D.R. forces, I've forgotten his name, but he is such a fool. We see him on manoeuvres and he shows no deep thinking, no wise or large-scale vision, he is very superficial and mediocre. But the main thing is that they (the Soviets) are afraid of the ordinary German citizens, they just hate the Soviets. They will shoot them down like partridges as soon as we go out into the field of battle, we will (have to) take up all around defence and fight both the F.R.G.'s and the D.D.R. Germans who will have run over to desert.

views on  
East  
Germans

107. G: And what if the Poles too rose up and attacked against the lines of communications? S: God grant that this will happen.

Poles

108. S: Now gentlemen I would like you to read this extremely important document. This is a photograph I took of the letter of the Central Committee of KGBS containing notes of the KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY talks in VIENNA. I didn't bother to photograph KENNEDY's questions since these are well known to us but I photographed the replies KHRUSHCHEV said he gave so that Mr. KENNEDY and our leaders could check and see what KHRUSHCHEV reports to the Communist Party not only of the U.S.S.R. but all the Communist parties of the world,

Kennedy  
meeting

because you will see at the beginning of this report a top secret order to pass the contents - in confidence - and verbally - to CASTRO, to the secretaries of the Communist parties of Italy etc. That is to say the respective Soviet Ambassador will summon TUGLIATTI for instance and will read the contents out to him. You will see, there is an exceptionally interesting introductory note there, giving instructions how to pass on the contents of this to the Communist party leaders in the U.S.S.R., the regional secretaries, because this letter is not to be seen by all members indiscriminately, and how to pass on the contents to the Communist (secretaries) of the sister parties in the rest of the world; and separately for Comrade CASTRO...The Soviet Ambassadors in the respective countries, will summon these people and pass on to them verbally the contents..... It is a most interesting introductory note, please translate it and pass it on to our leaders.....it is most interesting for them to see how all this is done. And this contains not only all KHRUSHCHEV's so-called statements, but also his concluding remark to KENNEDY; "Mr. KENNEDY, inform MACMILLAN, DE GAULLE and DENAUER that if they do not sign on our conditions, there will be war!" At least that is what he tells the Party he said to KENNEDY, but perhaps it wasn't quite so...and that is the interesting thing... A tremendous political analysis should be made and you and I are doing a great job here... I beg you to pass it on to your Governments at once.....(Subject then remarks how impressed he was with the firm answers given by KENNEDY to KHRUSHCHEV, and goes on to read out extracts from the document in question)....This will bring to light the real state of affairs and the attitude of the C.C. C.P.S.U. and KHRUSHCHEV towards this matter....that is to say: propaganda, aggressiveness and firmness....it is most important that KENNEDY should know this....

Comments  
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109. Q: When do the autumn manoeuvres take place in the U.S.S.R. - can they for instance give a definite military character to this autumn's manoeuvres, to give the impression of a type of mobilisation for instance.... in view of the BERLIN situation? S: No such demonstrative manoeuvres take place which are in fact a cover up for some sort of planned mobilisation as it is considered that everything is conducted in such absolute conspiratorial secrecy and all is so successfully concealed, that no extra precautions are necessary to conceal an actual mobilisation...they just mobilise! For instance, a review is now taking place of recent dismissals.... and it is just following its course....I know about it, you know about it and a few others..... Manoeuvres are not organised so as to conceal actual mobilisation. Q: On the contrary...in order to impress the West that you have such and such forces. S: I understand. There are no longer spring, summer, autumn manoeuvres, now we have only one type of manoeuvres - both inside the U.S.S.R. and in the Peoples Democracies, combined manoeuvres including one division from GDR, per army and these manoeuvres will continue, but they are no longer split into spring, autumn, winter, or garrison training - they are working in accordance with a combat training plan.

herb  
 procedure  
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 procedure

110. S: The call-up is proceeding according to age. KHRUSHCHEV has said people are to be "returned" [vozvrashat] (i.e. re-called) and the District Military Committee [Rajvoenkomat] have started re-calling the technical personnel, they are not taking the others yet, they have plenty. We take it for granted that everything that is done in U.S.S.R. is done under cover and in this case the manoeuvres are not a cover for mobilisation.

calling  
 started  
 technical  
 personnel

111. Q: But when the alarm is sounded, when the BERLIN situation becomes acute, will this affect all the WARSAW pact signatories? S: Yes. Simultaneously. They want to do all this as soon as the 22nd (Party) Congress finished its work. The Congress will take place in October.

back  
 Warsaw

112. Q: What is the opinion of prominent officers in the Soviet Union with regard to a possible revolt in say the GDR, Poland or Hungary? S: I can give you an exact answer to this question. Such things are not expected. No plans have been made for this. When hostilities begin, if the situation is favourable when the active elements go into action, then the mission is accomplished. If things become difficult the reinforcements

Intelligence  
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will join in the fight, and the alleged reason will be, say, for the unification of Germany, etc. This is the aspect in which this problem is seen here. Q: I mean if the war expands. S: Then plans can be brought into being which had been prepared by your Intelligence and your Command. And the worst situation for the Soviet Army is that the DDR enlisted men will defect as soon as action starts. When you put a pistol to someone's head he'll keep quiet. They only really expect individual actions, and there won't be any large scale ones.

115. Q: What do you think would happen if the leading echelons in the West Army would be West German troops? Do you think Germans would shoot at fellow Germans? S: Do not count on the GDR armies refusing to fire on the FRG ones. They will fire. Soviets don't count on all Germans who are under arms, the GDR officers and men fighting the West Germans, that is why a certain amount of purging is going on, but they are certain that the entire GDR Army will not lay down their arms when ordered to fire on the Western armies. Q: Whose opinion is this in addition to yours. S: KHROSHILOV's FEDOROV's, BIZANOV's and KUPIN's. KUPIN is very pleased that he is being transferred from GDR to MOSCOW, Military District, and so is his wife.

116. S: VARENISOV knows a lot, perhaps he doesn't tell it all, but when he voices his opinion he takes all he knows into consideration. His opinion is that the time is not right for action. I've told you why this is his opinion.

115. Q: But if they really want an extended war to break out, what are the main steps they would take, other than in the Berlin situation? S: ZHURUSHCHEV's Government of adventurers and his (GDR) consider in such a case, mass destruction by the firing of rockets. This is in view of the fact that the internal situation will not stand up to extended military operations, morale will not stand up to them, desertions will start in order to save life, as a result of personal dissatisfaction, low standard of living. So the plan is to slam you with rockets for mass destruction and then the internal situation will right itself on its own. They are relying on mass destruction for which they are actively preparing. There is such a plan. Have I made myself clear?

116. Q: If a report along the line of what you have just told us and sent to us appeared in the Western press, what would be the Soviet people's reaction? S: They would never get to know about it. All the Soviet Press is under the Control of the Central Committee. For example Mr. RUFK's declarations were only published in full in the magazine "Abroad" [Za rubezhom], which has a very limited circulation. I read it, as I have access to all publications. Only excerpts were published in the daily press. It was a very fine article well thought out and if our people read it they would see things as they really are. However, they only see Pravda, Izvestia and others of a real yellow Press.

117. Q: What about Government officials? How would they react to what you have said and given us. S: If it reached all the various branches of the Administration it would, undoubtedly, create a very strong impression. But believe me, certain papers, marked with a red classification don't reach even party district heads. All they are fed on is "PRAVDA" and "IZVESTIA".

118. Q: What would happen if we did smash through their tank forces blocking access to Berlin as you suggested? S: They would double strength in that area, and then we would have to double ours, slapping them in the teeth once again. Q: And then they will retreat? S: Yes. So our problem is to burn their tanks out and place our there.

119. Q: Why do they have to cover the road approaches to BERLIN with Soviet forces? If they sign a treaty they can use the German forces.

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S: Because GDR is not strong enough. However, the Soviet Army will be the second support echelon and this fact will be known to the enemy. A German regiment may be backed up by a Soviet Division. G: So the very first units will be GDR units? S: Yes. Germans but reinforced by Soviets.

*Q: How will they control the air corridors?*  
120. G: How will they control the air corridors? With German or with Soviet aircraft? S: With German and Soviet aircraft, mostly Soviet since the Germans have very few. However, joint action is planned.

*Q: Will they shoot down the Western aircraft which -*  
121. G: Will they shoot down the Western aircraft which - S: Yes, they will shoot them down. They are making preparations for this, with fighters and A.A. weapons.

*Q: Does VARENTSOV think this too?*  
122. G: Does VARENTSOV think this too? S: Yes. After all I am not the Head of GDR, I am continuing the analysis which Sergei Sergeevich has said in reply to your serious and very detailed questions. I have tried to tell you all from this source. You can check it by other sources.

*Q: Has he said anything about V-75 in connection with BERLIN?*  
123. G: Has he said anything about V-75 in connection with BERLIN? S: As I have already told you V-75 is a tested rocket which can be found everywhere, even in the Berlin area. It is produced in large quantities. That is a proven weapon in which they believe. I am sure this weapon is already in Germany.

*Q: So in spite of the fact that Sergei Sergeevich says that the Treaty is ready for signing your opinion is that KHRUSHCHEV may NOT sign it if enough pressure is brought to bear?*  
124. G: So in spite of the fact that Sergei Sergeevich says that the Treaty is ready for signing your opinion is that KHRUSHCHEV may NOT sign it if enough pressure is brought to bear? S: Yes, KHRUSHCHEV knows that he had many deficiencies. We have been witnesses before now of KHRUSHCHEV retreating or naming new dates, or just shutting up. I want to repeat once again. Let us take the situation: The GDR have set out their blocking forces the second line is formed from Soviet tanks and artillery, we break through, they send reinforcements into the breach, but they will stick to the same limited area. The Soviet forces will not extend the fighting area. We must be prepared for them taking a gamble and expanding the conflict but according to the plan in force now, they will not expand the conflict. They will, however, increase forces continually in that area until they are overwhelmed. So we must have enough forces to suppress them.

*Q: Do you still consider, in spite of the fact well known to you and the Soviet Government that the main strength Western forces are mainly strategic and not tactical, that is locally, in the European Theatres, do you still think it is necessary or advisable to make a show of force specifically in Europe?*  
125. G: Do you still consider, in spite of the fact well known to you and the Soviet Government that the main strength Western forces are mainly strategic and not tactical, that is locally, in the European Theatres, do you still think it is necessary or advisable to make a show of force specifically in Europe? S: Yes, show strength on German territory. This is VARENTSOV's opinion also: that it will all have a localized character only...only several flare-ups, several battles in the zone of communications...what he VARENTSOV means by zone of communications and what I mean by zone of Communications is, say - along the highways and railroads leading to Berlin.

*Q: And what do the Soviet Government consider will be the key steps for defence on the part of the West if the latter decide to hang on to BERLIN to the bitter end?*  
126. G: And what do the Soviet Government consider will be the key steps for defence on the part of the West if the latter decide to hang on to BERLIN to the bitter end? S: They expect the following: a rapid completion of re-arming of the FRG and also increase the strength of their forces in Europe, both in numbers and armaments. And this is what they fear! The publication by Mr. KENNEDY of the 3 milliard increase in the defence budget created a very strong impression. Bravo, good for him! That kicked them in the teeth! They are convinced that these 3 milliards are going to be approved, although the Soviet High Command are convinced that there are also some other secret military funds at the disposal of the armed forces (of the U.S.) after all these exist in the Soviet Army and the USSR...they are therefore convinced that although they said 3 million, they will have at their disposal not 3 but 6 or even 9 milliards....They are afraid...and already they are

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beginning to scratch their heads.

127. Q: What was the impression as a result of the French moving a division back from Africa to Europe? S: A great noise was raised everywhere that this is an obvious preparation to interfere with the signature of the agreement and so on.... Many more similar preparatory moves must take place so that the 'avoloch' - adventurer, that he will view it in the broad sense of things and not as a calculation for a purely small operation of local importance only but in its general widespread war aspect.... If he will receive several more kicks in the teeth like these announcements he will be faced with the following dilemma: either let things calm down and accept the fact that the West is so well prepared that it could move over to a general destruction... and he will certainly do so because he himself is not ready to answer (hit) back in full! Suppose he will send a bomber over these islands where are now (U.K.) and a rocket into America, and this will not be a direct hit, ["ne budet pritsel'no"] he knows perfectly well that all the strategic airforce (of the West) armed with rockets is hanging fire over the USSR... he knows that very well and he is keeping it in mind, but he says out loud: I've got the same! But he hasn't got the same - that's just it! Q: And Sergei Sergeevich knows this too? S: And Sergei Sergeevich knows this and says: We are going on a gamble.

128. Q: And they won't be ready in November either? S: No, after all how much is there left till November? Of course, it won't be ready. But the order has been given to reinforce everything already available, to train, to complete equipping with armaments, correct (faults) to maintain everything on a war-footing.

129. S: As I've already told you - and I consider this my sacred duty - to point out to you that the Soviet High Command and KHRUSHCHEV together with his Government are not only one single incident ["styokha"] in this German corridor (Area) but several incidents... that is to say he will build up the attack in the hope that he will break up the advancing forces of NATO in this area. He will for instance send out and deploy there say one tank army - we (the West) destroy it. He (KHRUSHCHEV) will at once send out another one - he has another echelon... I have already told you how many armies he has; how many armies there are in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, on our Soviet territory (Soviet Union) in Poland etc. tanks etc.... which I beg you to pass on and treat with due importance and consideration... This is not a bluff, these are not match-boxes these are tanks moving rapidly on caterpillars and firing! If these are knocked out, he will replace them with others, saying "I will make them choke in this corridor!" Whereas we must do everything in our power to make him choke instead! He will then be faced with the dilemma: what to do next? Is it worth going further or not? And since he has not got the strength to fight out on a general wide-spread front, he will have to pipe down. Or alternatively if he finds out through Intelligence sources that there will be endless forces thrown in to replace the ones he knocks out, then he will stop at the very beginning and will not carry on the the signing of the agreement. These are the possibilities.

130. Q: Do you think it possible that the Soviets may attempt to give us false and misleading information through Intelligence channels? S: Oh yes you mean des. Yes, this is being done constantly. There is such a specific category of activity. Specifically they may spread rumours that the forces of the D.D.R. are larger than actually and that they are all in combat readiness and the ULLBRICHT has been making successful and popular visits, they can lie about the status of the East German soldiers morale.

131. Q: Are they actually doing this now? S: Yes, and they will continue to do this. Q: Do you know of any specific operations now in progress? For example, information given to a double agent recruited by the Soviets or through any high level penetration they may have?

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131. This is all done on a planned basis and is controlled by one headquarters. This is known to GREGORIO who is even related to KHRUSHCHEV and he consults with him on these political matters, but I don't know of any specific example.

132. Q: Do you know of any high level penetrations in Western governments who co-operate with KHRUSHCHEV and on whom he may depend on in making BERLIN policy? S: Yes, there are, all the Secretaries of foreign Communist Parties in capitalistic countries. These should be strangled, but very little is done about them.

133. Q: I mean non-Communist persons who are prominent? S: I heard about Cyrus Eaton and I reported to you about him. As this Central Committee letter shows the addressees are all Communist Party secretaries and others favourable to KHRUSHCHEV. I cannot understand why these Communists are not eliminated, they did this once before in Turkey. As a member of the free world now I realise that my governments are wise, but I must be a complete fool since it is totally incomprehensible to me why persons like CASTRO and TOGHLIATI and the other Communists in the West are not eliminated since they are obviously creating a Fifth Column. As persons these individuals are nothing, but they do influence masses of people. At one time ATTATURK shot the Communists and in later years, NAHSER and KASSEM also threw them out, why can't we do the same?

134. (Subject continues to criticise the humanitarian and liberal Western nations for not wiping out all Communists within their reach, basing his arguments on the very letter from the Central Committee which appeals for Communist support throughout the world. Subject stressed his intimate knowledge of the Communist Party operations which are completely deceitful and which he is trying in every way he can to convince the Governments of the West to take stern measures against. Subject particularly emphasized the danger that CASTRO may influence other Latin American peoples appearing as a Latin-type LENIN).

135. (Following a few minutes intermission subject said) "We have agreed that I give you all and we will join all our forces and possibilities for our work. You and I have been working together for less than a year, in fact we have been working together since only 20th April".  
Q: Yes. S: a few months, a very few months. Let us look at the results. We, with your help, under your direction, with my possibilities, which I do not exaggerate, we brought to light a series of new questions of a political character - dealing with Central Committee of U.S.S.R., we touched upon many subjects related to the GYTK which deals with technical intelligence....is it now clear to us. I've told you how the delegations are made up, you read that representatives of KGB and GRU are included. We have brought to light military questions. We consider our tasks to have been carried out. Oh, but this is only the beginning. "Is 5 per cent".

136. S: If we analyse everything: concrete questions, material available, information, some of which possibly needs checking - that is the law, from a dialectic point of view, we also are learning a sort of dialectics but a type different from the Marx kind, we have given each other a lot.

137. S: We already have the moral right to say that for some of the questions we now have a new view, we have certain material which can't be thrown out, material extracted from our common scale of opinions, understanding conversations, wishes, and actions. That is to say that I consider that our work is aimed at a target, it is many-sided, it has not got a narrow, one-sided aspect.

138. S: All right we haven't got to the bottom of some things, but we'll get there. Everything can't be done at once. This is the first road we are standing on. I guarantee that the conditions of any sudden aggression which may be planned will be immediately communicated to

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our H.Q. [Kommandovanie], complete with facts. What these facts are going to be I will let you know, when I discover them. That is one of the principal tasks. G: Of course. S: And so when we discover a series of new, basic facts there is one thing I am afraid of. I am afraid that we won't be able to carry through to the end and get the facts to our organisations, to our authorities, so that they could draw new, practical conclusions.

139. S: I would like to be wrong. Take for example that letter and introduction. One must understand that CASTRO is not only going to read it for information. There is lot we don't know, and we may never know, because my hand carrying the MINOX cannot reach that far, neither can our eyes reach that far. This must be developed however. If this much is given to CASTRO, and we know that millions are being given him, then he is involved also in other things. What conclusion can we draw from this? Eliminate him, at least stop him from developing more followers. That is were we are going to lose unnecessarily if we do not do this. How can we achieve this. I do not know how many more Central Committee letters I will have to open. I will open everything that passes through my hands. You are helping me in my search, by giving me material assistance. I am now able to take people to restaurants, I buy people drinks. I give presents. Everybody is pleased. People ask me to get them things. RUDIN himself has asked me to get him three sets of batteries, but has he given me money? You are going to buy them, you are going to spend £5 - £10. Then people have asked me to get cameras, rings and so on. We do all this but we discover only this and that. I want deep conclusions to be drawn - don't expect to suddenly uncover something, just like spreading out a carpet.

/for  
cameras

140. G: What makes you think that we are not doing this? S: It isn't being done. G: You don't consider that it is possible tomorrow morning to act on your suggestion since there are considerations of a tactical nature, a question of timing. S: You can kill me but I cannot see what are your tactical considerations in the matter of CASTRO. Why do you keep CASTRO on? G: CASTRO will fall. Steps are being taken and at the proper time.

141. S: One day! With this "one day, sometime" we miss the bus. The right moment is a factor. Surely you didn't fly thousands of kilometres to see me, in order to say "you are our friend". I know I am your friend. I am pleased to see you. You are pleased to see me. I can't give you all the secrets of GHQ, all the maps, all the plans - I can't get near them. There are documents which a Marshal reads and signs for, and if he wants to re-read them he has to sign for them again. So they know that Marshal so and so read this document five times. No one else can see these documents. And I don't see us recruiting a Marshal. Take VARENTEVOV - once he has become a chief Marshal, he begins to like KHRUSHCHEV, you can't get anywhere near him. That's the way people act. He is well off financially, he has power, he wears badges of rank, he has a car, he has followers, he has a suite, he has a guard, a dacha, so "long live KHRUSHCHEV"! And who is KHRUSHCHEV? VARENTEVOV used to say that KHRUSHCHEV is a fool and an adventurer, and now he drinks his health. I raised my glass: what can one do, but I didn't drink to him. I swear to you that he was thinking as we do but since he has started wearing the enormous USSR coat of arms - it's all over. A man is a man. You can't explain everybody's actions.

142. S: You may laugh at me and call me a braggard, but I take a lot upon myself because I feel I can do a lot. I have so far given you very little, but no matter how much I can give you I can't give you everything. And you won't have in every Directorate. One must face the truth. You must have a broader view. For this far-sighted men exist. These wise, far-sighted people should be more decisive. That is the wish of a strategic officer, member of GHQ staff of one of the branches of GHQ of USSR. G: I assure you this is being done. S: No,

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not at the moment. G: You can't always have the results put in front of you. S: We should either work according to such a method that they (our HQ) believe us. Or else we just get together and drink wine. S: We have such sources at our disposal, and, they can't be carried through to their logical conclusion. That is what I am afraid of. God forbid, God forbid. Now take Mr. HAROLD. I love him very much. I think of him every day, as I do of you. I swear, I think of you (of him) many times during the day. When I go to bed at night I wonder what he is doing, whether he is thinking of me. I listen to the radio - 163..... And to-day Mr. HAROLD looked at this material and said "A collection of articles, noteworthy abstract articles" but they are not, they are the views of (HIQ) of the USSR.

143. G: We only developed them to-day. We have just received them. S: We will sort this out among ourselves, but the high-ups, that Lord who sent me a message, which I prize greatly, he may say "this is not what we want". This is what I am afraid of. G: Do not worry about this. You are valued and the material as well. S: This is our first meeting; we are just getting organised with the elucidation of a number of questions, new material, and I just wanted to tell you what was bothering me. G: You don't have to worry at all. S: All these things won't stop me. Our contract is to fight. (G: explains subject's worries in English). G: You have the impatience of youth. S: I am not a young man, look at my grey hairs. You remember I told you if we don't risk all our diamonds, gold and valuables we will be destroyed; if we risk them our wealth will be tripled. We are taking too long to get started. S: I swear to you - believe me, as a strategic officer, these first steps of firm declarations, of a firm position, taken by Mr. MacMillan, Mr. Kennedy, that excellent fellow de Gaulle and Adenauer, who is also a good chap, have already brought into play a new element. Perhaps the best thing to do is to declare you have more than you have. Why should this bald devil get away with everything, everybody listens to him, he lies - and perhaps that is the right way to act. And all we do is say, "better don't do anything".

144. G: On this subject, could you tell me, how can we misinform this bald devil. Perhaps his Intelligence people do not have all the facts. S: His Intelligence Service is not all powerful. G: How can we get false information through to him? S: Do a little and magnify it five times. I repeat prepare tanks, anti-tank defence, increase your forces. Do it on the scale of a division and say you've got an Army Corps. And disseminate this information along all channels; press conference, and all the rest. (Say to him): "You dirty scum so you now declare that you will sign without us, after being our ally during the war, after we have fed you, we have supplied you with weapons, with transport. All your artillery, all calibres, would have been sunk in mud had we not supplied the transport. And now you willfully want to swallow up Berlin". I assure you that this is just the first step, he will swallow Berlin. Tell him "for this behaviour we are going to slap your face". This will make him stop and think. G: Can we do anything about this along Intelligence lines? S: Of course. And you must work from all sides.

145. G: What is the 5th Directorate, GRU, doing about this? S: Setting up their agency networks [agentura]. Have you read that letter of mine? All this is still going on, all agency networks have been activated and are in direct contact. This is being done everywhere, including the countries of the Far East. G: With regard to the BERLIN question, have "their" (GRU 5th Directorate) agents not become activated. S: Yes, all branches. The tasks have already been allocated.

146. S: now, before I forget. SUD'IN has gone on leave. He has been made a General. And by the way he was an Air Force colonel, but has now become an infantry General. He was preparing to go to Turkey, then he used the following subterfuge. He said his wife was ill - he didn't want to go to Turkey. So they said to him "you scoundrel, we

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made you a General as you were going to do an important job. You were going to set up an illegal residentura using agents from other countries, not the Turks, there might be Swedes there, Bulgarians, etc." This embarrassed him and he went off on leave. Before he left - I handed the papers (SUDIN's) in to General POZOVNIY yesterday, he asked me to get him a nylon shirt, neck measurement 43 cm. - I gave him the paper that had to be typed - that paper I told you about giving SUDIN a telephone, the paper had already been signed, all POZOVNIY had to do is to get it re-typed on a special form for VARENISOV to sign, and once it has been signed POZOVNIY will keep it until my return to USSR. SUDIN asked me before he left "Get me a telephone, even if I am going away". His application has either already been visaed for Turkey, or soon will be. I think he should be allowed in "andsurrounded so that we can be kept informed. If we do this we will be wise people.

147. Q: Listen, through what channels and what actually should one say in order for it to sound like the truth to KHRUSHCHEV? This disinformation about forces, etc. S: The best way would be through Press, Radio, and through those people who we have doubled and who work for KHRUSHCHEV - he believes them. Q: And the important thing is to get across that there are more forces etc. S: Yes, that we have secret information, numbers assigned, atomic missile launchers (atomye pushki). STRAUSS has the right approach to this problem. We have got to envisage the situation in such a way that should the necessity arise we would give atom war-heads to ANNEAUER. You can say "we didn't want to give it him, but if you (KHRUSHCHEV) are going to take one-sided action you force us to do it".

148. Q: Now you are going to pay a number of visits to your Embassy here. Are there people in the Residentura or the Embassy, among the MPA personnel, who you think could have reliable information on the BERLIN question? Perhaps they have received special instructions, or perhaps they could tell that in the event of worsened relations it had been decided to send fewer delegations, either to England or to other NATO countries, or perhaps they have cut down on the number of families allowed to accompany Embassy officials. Do you think there could be such indications? S: Yes, there can be such indications. They should be watched, and analysed.

149. Q: Would it be normal for you to ask "What do you think about the BERLIN question? How will it react on you here in England?" S: Yes, of course I could discuss this matter. PAVLOV has said that he would like me to visit his home. I'll tell you about it. Actually, PAVLOV when he was leaving for England asked for a transfer out of here and they want to make me a Counsellor for Technical Science here and Deputy Resident to LEV, Then recall him in a year and make me the Resident for England. This is the GRU plan, but the Central Committee will say "And who is father?" "The father is a White officer who fought against the Soviet Government and his son could finish that Government off". Exactly what the son is in actual fact doing. (Laughs). GRU has complete faith in me, I swear. That time I returned I went to SHOLINOV, Head of Cadres Directorate, I gave him two fountain pens, the most expensive purse I bought here at Harrods, cards and a bottle of scent. He said "this is embarrassing" and I replied "Why embarrassing, they gave me these gifts, believe me the firms I visited said "(true name) our present to you", what am I to do with all this lot?" "Well, in that case, thank you very much".

150. S: The money that the U.S. and British Government give me I do not spend on myself only. Q: Did you give VARENISOV a present? S: He'll get one. This is the easiest of things. (S: goes on to describe a table lighter, shaped like a rocket, which he saw in a shop this morning. He also wants a battery electric razor, which he intends giving VARENISOV as a birthday present on 15th September, when VARENISOV will be 60).

151. H: Wont you be on leave at that time?

S: I intend postponing my leave, as Ekaterina Karpova has said to me the last time they were at the villa the artists have already been booked and you'll be the major domo". (Subject then goes on to suggest that they find a bottle of wine produced in the year VARENTSOV was born and make him a gift of it. This play had enormous success when used by the Counsellor in CANADA, (GORUNOV who sent a similar gift to Gennadij Vasil'evich ALEKSEJIKO (or ALEKSEJIKO), RUDIN's Deputy). RUDNEV's

152. Subject then goes on to say that "The Chief Marshal" gets, in new currency, 2,500 (roubles) a month. Last trip when POZOVNIY heard that was once again flying to the big islands" he left a message for him "not to forget old soldiers", so subject brought him back a number of gifts for himself and his wife. "They kissed me. In spite of the fact that he is a rich man, he has savings amounting to hundreds of thousands in old currency, he adores presents". Everyone going abroad brings presents.

153. S: Now, I think I've told you everything about the GMITK Committee. There is nothing more on the Committee. G: Yes, but here is something important about BERLIN, could you find out whether special tasks have been given either to the Resident or to someone else in your Embassy here? Have instructions been given on what action is to be taken should the situation there deteriorate. What intelligence tasks to be undertaken in England with regard to the Berlin question have they been given? G: That is clear. I am sure there is something, I am sure VORONIN did not come just by chance, he has some kind of mission; he is the Head [Nachalnik Napravleniya] of a Direction.

154. G: We would also like to know the personal opinions of Embassy staff, if they dare voice a personal opinion, particularly if they disagree with KHROUSHCHEV. S: I think I can find out about the instructions received, but not the opinions and thoughts of the colony. It would look suspicious for "A MOSCOW man sent on a pedagogic mission" to try and find out people's opinions.

155. G: If you make notes do it very innocuously. (S) explains his very safe way of making notes, then goes again on to describe his meeting with the woman and her children and the clever way in which he noted. He also suggests that as he is Head of Department he could quite safely be invited to the British Embassy. He has already been invited by the Americans, at the time when the Patent Delegation visited the USSR). G: After you met her at an Embassy reception officially there would be a logical legend for greeting her in town later.

156. (S) suggests that there be no meeting the following day as he has a lot of work to do and must meet his people. This would also give the other people time to study the material available. --Follows argument about how a suit should be bought for subject. He requests a dark grey suit for next day. M. agrees to get one for him at Simpsons. Also whether or not a dental plate could be made for him, since his Moscow dentist is very ill.

157. Subject was shown the map of London to orient him. Subject shows list of people he knows in England. Export Manager of HAWKER SIDDELEY - BELLINGER. MILOVIDOV has given him his card. He has a book for subject. ERSEX whom subject met at the Fair in LONDON. Subject then checks over list of documents he had brought with him and was to hand over.

158. The next meeting was set for the afternoon of 20 July, WYNE would relay exact time. Subject then refers to SOEKARNO's visit to MOSCOW and says that the Soviets had given him a lot of arms and money as they really want to hit the Dutch hard. The situation there is very serious and an attack may start this year. Subject will give further details later.

159. Subject left at 0100 hours 19 July 1961.